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1.  Introduction 
 
The dominant view in legal scholarship is that transactional lawyers add value by 
serving as reputational intermediaries. The notion is that a key function of an elite law 
firm -- like the function of an elite investment bank or accounting firm -- is to “rent” its 
reputation to a pending transaction [40].  While this is a widely accepted thesis, the 
question is how much value do they create?  No one seriously disputes that lawyers also 
do a lot of other more traditionally lawyerly things like helping with regulatory 
compliance, drafting contracts, finding tax loopholes and so on. No one also disputes that 
other institutions such as investment banks and accounting firms also serve as 
reputational intermediaries on many of the same transactions.  But can we determine, as 
an empirical matter, whether the role that lawyers play as reputational intermediaries is a 
central one (as many in the legal literature suggest) or a marginal one (as some skeptics 
argue)?  
The classic work on lawyers as reputational intermediaries is a 1984 paper by 
Ronald Gilson [40].  Gilson posits that transactional lawyers help reduce transactions 
costs.  He observes that they do things like advise clients about future contingencies, 
identify differences in valuations among parties and generally help deals get done.1   The 
key element of Gilson’s thesis regarding the value added by lawyers, however, has to do 
with information costs.  The big law firms that specialize in transactional work (M&A, 
private equity, debt issuances, public offerings, and so on) play the role of reputational 
intermediaries or, as it is often referred to, “gatekeepers”.  
Gilson’s reputational intermediary story has generated a significant amount of 
debate.2  The basic argument is that most large financial transactions involve significant 
asymmetric information or verification problems among the various players (investors, 
issuers, bankers, regulators, etc.).  Because the parties involved in these transactions are 
generally not repeat “transactors”, they cannot help solve these problems by credibly 
asserting that their own reputations are at stake. Counterparties are going to be concerned 
about the incentives to overstate the value of any transaction.3  The large, modern law 
                                                        
1
 E.g., Gardner [36], Gilson and Mnookin [41]. 
2
 E.g., Barnett [4],[5], Dent [21], Kim [46], Carney, Dent and Gilson [16], Wilkins [63]. 
3
 See Gilson [40], Okamoto [52], Bainbridge [3].  
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firms, however, are institutions that have built up reputations over decades, whilst serving 
a wide range of clients.  They are repeat transactors, which gives them the ability to help 
solve information/verification problems by acting as intermediaries and lending their 
reputation to the transaction.4 
The puzzle though is that there is nothing lawyerly about this function. 
Investment bankers and accountants also work in firms that are repeat transactors.  
Indeed, bankers and accountants often have more money at stake if their reputations are 
tarnished – witness the case of Arthur Anderson’s demise in the wake of the Enron 
debacle.5  And these institutions should be, in theory, able to perform at least the same 
reputational intermediary role being posited for law firms. Critics of the Gilson thesis, 
making this point and others, have questioned the extent to which the reputational 
bonding role of lawyers is significant.6  
The theoretical literature has generated at least three unanswered empirical 
questions.  First, how plausible is the reputational intermediary model for lawyers?  
Second, to the extent that the Gilson model is plausible, can we quantify how much value 
lawyers add in their role as reputational intermediaries? Third, how has the role of 
lawyers as reputational intermediaries evolved over time?  We believe that our empirical 
analyses shed light on these questions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the general 
context of the sovereign debt market and the related literature to reputational 
intermediaries. Section 3 describes our database. Section 4 presents our main results 
about lawyers as reputational intermediaries. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background and Context 
2.1. The Sovereign Debt Market 
We analyze the role of transactional lawyers through the lens of the market for 
sovereign debt. The basic characteristics of the sovereign debt market suggest that it 
should be a good area in which to test the lawyers-as-gatekeeper thesis. Sovereign issuers 
face three key problems. First, there is an asymmetric information problem. The finances 
of sovereigns tend to be opaque in the best of circumstances – the recent woes of the 
                                                        
4
 Ribstein [54].  
5
 E.g., Rauterkus and Song [53].  
6
 E.g., Schwarcz [58], Lipshaw [48], Ribstein [54].  
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Euro area provide an illustration of this.7 In addition, the primary asset of a sovereign is 
the willingness of its citizens to pay taxes – a difficult matter to predict.  Foreign 
investors are at a particular disadvantage in terms of being able to observe the sovereign’s 
finances or predict the future preferences of its voters. 
Second, sovereigns are difficult to sue, and even more difficult to enforce 
contractual agreements against. Even with explicit waivers of sovereign immunity, 
finding assets to serve as collateral or repayment is an onerous task.  
Third, while sovereigns are, in theory, infinitely lived entities, their agents 
(politicians and bureaucrats) are not.  The primary goal of most politicians is to win 
elections, which necessarily gives them a short-term focus.  
Reputational intermediaries could solve the foregoing problems. But they would 
have to: (1) demonstrate themselves as having the skill and ability to evaluate the 
complex and opaque information about the sovereign; and (2) be able to credibly show 
that they would have much to lose if their representations regarding a sovereign and a 
pending issue turned out to be incorrect. In theory, both investment banks and law firms 
that ply their trade in the sovereign debt market have the abilities and incentives 
described above. 
Further, the sovereign debt area is one in which alternate explanations for what 
transactional lawyers do may be of limited importance – at least in comparison to 
domestic corporate issuances in the U.S.  For example, consider three primary 
competitors of the reputational intermediary story where lawyers add value in terms of: 
(1) helping clients negotiate regulatory barriers; (2) performing due diligence in 
anticipating future contingencies and making sure that the terms of the debt contracts 
protect against things going wrong; and (3) assisting the client in dealing with legal 
claims. At first cut, none of these explanations seems to have much promise. First, there 
are few regulations governing the issuance of sovereign debt. Second, in terms of the 
effort that might be exerted in drafting and revising contracts, most of the documents are 
boilerplate.  Third, in terms of lawyers providing protection against legal claims, 
                                                        
7
 The problem of opacity in sovereign finances has received attention recently, thanks to the crisis in the 
euro area.  Academic papers have documented a wide range of accounting devices that have been used by 
sovereign issuers to try and mislead both regulators and the markets. E.g., Buti, Martins and Turrini [15], 
Dias, Richmond and Wright [23], Buchheit and Gulati [14], Irwin [43]. 
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sovereign debtors are relatively immune against lawsuits; after all, they are sovereigns.  
Given the foregoing, the reputational-intermediary story is a plausible explanation for the 
functions of lawyers in this market.8  
We test the implications of this theory using an extensive dataset of sovereign 
bonds covering almost 200 years.  In constructing this database we encountered 
numerous limitations due in part to the lack of regulatory requirements mandating very 
much disclosure on the part of issuers.  In particular, we do not have information on how 
much individual law firms were compensated on specific transactions.  The absence of 
information on the price of a product as vague as “reputational intermediary” makes it 
difficult to evaluate the quality of the product.  Consequently, even if we are able to 
determine that it is likely that law firms are serving as reputational intermediaries in this 
market, the lack of information on how much they are charging makes it difficult to draw 
conclusions of how important this role is. Nevertheless, we believe that the empirical 
analysis that follows takes some steps towards tackling this and related issues.  
2.2 Literature 
There is a considerable literature examining the effects of intermediaries in 
providing credibility enhancements for products across a number of markets 9 
Intermediaries do sometimes appear to play a role in adding credibility.10 
Economics and finance scholars studying the reputational intermediary question 
generally assume that the reputation that underwriters bring to an issue is the primary 
mechanism for solving the asymmetric information problem. 11  This construct has led to 
an extensive literature relating the reputation of investment bankers to the cost of 
capital.12  The evidence shows that investment banks with high reputations are associated 
with high quality, low-risk issuances and higher banker fees. The evidence also shows 
that investors are willing to pay a premium for certification of the quality of an issue, as 
investors interpret an agreement with a reputable underwriter as a positive signal 
                                                        
8
 See also Buchheit [13].  
9
 Generally, see Klein [47], Jin, Kato and List [45].  
10
 E.g., Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson and Steffanoni [37], Riley [56].  
11
 See Milgrom and Roberts [51], Shapiro [59], Diamond [22].  
12
 See Chemmanur and Fulghieri [18]. 
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regarding the quality of the issue.13  Thus, reputable and larger investment banks appear 
to be associated with higher quality issues, lower yields and higher fees.14 
Only a handful of studies have examined the impact of lawyers on the cost of 
capital and the majority of these studies focus exclusively on corporate issuances. To the 
extent that lawyer reputation matters in reducing the cost of capital, the relevant 
reputation is that of the underwriter’s counsel.15  The reputation of the issuer’s counsel 
does not appear to reduce capital costs and may even increase them.16 
In the context of the sovereign debt market, the most relevant work has been by 
Marc Flandreau and a series of coauthors [28] [29] [30] [31] [32].17  They find that in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, underwriters performed a gatekeeping role in the 
sovereign debt market. Banking houses such as the Rothschilds and Barings would 
commit to monitoring borrowers and ensure that these borrowers behaved themselves 
vis-à-vis investors.18 Over long periods of time, these banks developed close relationships 
with particular sovereign debtors. An example is the relationship between the Rothschilds 
and Brazil; one that survived the Brazilian government transitioning through a variety of 
types of governments including a monarchy, a military dictatorship and a democracy.19 It 
should be noted that Brazil as well as other Rothschild’s clients were of the highest 
quality.20  Investors might not be able to obtain good information about a sovereign’s 
financial condition, but they could rely on the historical performance of the bank that was 
underwriting the issue. Quantitatively, the Flandreau et al. studies find a strong 
relationship between sovereign bond defaults and underwriter reputation in the 1800s and 
early 1900s.  However this relation disappears in the post-World War II era.21  
3. Data 
                                                        
13
 See Fang [24]. 
14
 See James [44], Carter, Dark and Sing [17], Fang [24], Livingston and Miller [49]. 
15
 See Barondes, Nyce and Sanger [6], Beatty and Welch [8], Fang [24] . 
16
 See Fang [24].  
17
 See Chemmanur and Fulghieri [18]. See also Flores [33].   
18
 Flandreau and Flores [28]. 
19
 For a historical treatment of the Rothschilds, see Ferguson [25] [26]. 
20
 See Flandreau Flores [28]. 
21
 See, e.g., Flores [33]. 
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Our dataset covers roughly a two hundred year period, from 1823 to 2012. In 
constructing our dataset we drew on a variety of sources. For the entire period, we have 
2,091 sovereign bond contracts issued by 128 sovereigns. 
We divide the dataset into two separate sub-periods, depending on the source of 
the data and how they were collected.  The first sub-period is from 1820 to 1945.  In most 
cases, our sources for these data are the copies of the physical bearer bonds themselves.  
These bonds are not the actual contracts, but typically report the key contract terms to 
prospective purchasers of the instrument. For this pre-World War II period, there is no 
single source of sovereign bonds that comes close to being comprehensive.  We 
constructed our dataset for this period from roughly a dozen museums, archives and 
libraries. 22   We then supplemented these materials from information in newspapers 
advertisements and discussions in investor reports at the time.  From these various 
sources, we have information on roughly 600 bonds from the pre-World War II period.  
There are gaps in the data; we have only a few offerings from the Amsterdam market of 
the early 1800s, and it is likely that we are missing a number of bonds that were issued on 
the Paris market. Nevertheless, we have one of the most comprehensive datasets on 
sovereign bond contract terms for the period in question. 
For the post-World War II period, public databases provide fairly comprehensive 
data on sovereign bonds, particularly for the years 1980-2011. We accessed two 
databases for our post-World War II data: Thomson One Banker and Perfect Information. 
Our sources for this period are the prospectuses and offering circulars that were filed with 
the relevant exchanges or regulatory authorities.  These sales documents typically report 
on the key contract terms of the bond contract.  Both the Thomson and Perfect 
Information databases are incomplete in terms of the data they report on bonds issued 
between 1945 and 1980. We were able to supplement the data for this period somewhat, 
however, from information available from the sources mentioned above.  In sum, we 
have a sample of 1,479 bonds, issued by 104 sovereigns over the years 1946-2012. 
                                                        
22
 The archives include: Rothschilds, Barings, UBS, HSBC, Guildhall, the Library of Congress, the British 
Library, the Morgan Library, the Harvard Business School, Yale University, Cornell University, Duke 
University, Columbia University and Wertpapierwelt. 
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For each bond, we obtained the actual bond and/or the relevant sales documents 
and coded nine parameters: issuer, issue date, maturity date, interest rate at issuance,23 
governing law, lead underwriter, number of underwriters in the syndicate, issuer’s 
counsel, and underwriter’s counsel.  From other public data, we obtained the rating of 
each issuance.  Bond ratings are not available for the full pre-World War II period.  
However, as we demonstrate below, ratings are very relevant for the post-World War II 
period.  For that period, we rely on the bond ratings from S&P.  Where ratings from S&P 
are not available, we use a rating by one of its competitors (Moody’s or Fitch) and 
convert those ratings into their equivalent on the S&P scale.  
In total, there are approximately 128 issuers and 2,091 issues in our dataset. Our 
sample varies from issuers who have conducted hundreds of offerings (e.g., Argentina) to 
those that have done one or two (e.g., Namibia or Ghana).  Table 1 presents the top 50 
issuers in our sample and the number and timing of their issuances. All of these are bonds 
were issued in international markets, suggesting that the buyers were primarily foreign 
investors.  Almost none of the bonds were issued in domestic currencies. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
4.  Testing for Lawyers as Reputational Intermediaries 
4.1 The Basic Transactional Context  
Lawyers do not necessarily have an important role to play in a sovereign debt 
issuance.  The requirements in terms of mandatory disclosures and regulatory filings tend 
to be simple, given that these are sovereign issuers who are assumed to be relatively safe 
for the most part.  The two primary participants in a sovereign issuance are the issuer and 
the underwriter.24   Given the size and sophistication of the types of sovereigns and 
underwriters who participate in this market, it is safe to assume that both sets of entities 
will tend to have in-house counsel. In other words, sovereign issuances could probably be 
done without the need to hire outside lawyers, which is the case for the largest and most 
reputable issuers such as Germany and the United States.  Less reputable sovereigns and 
                                                        
23
 Our analysis focuses on the when-issued rate since these bonds rarely trade and market prices are 
unavailable. See Section 5 for a further justification for using when-issued rates. 
24
 Throughout this article, we use the terms underwriters and investment bankers interchangeably.   
9 
 
underwriters, who do hire outside counsel, are possibly incurring expenses that they 
could avoid.25  This is particularly so since the law firms that tend to work in this market 
are among the most elite (and, therefore, most expensive) in New York and London.  
According to the reputational intermediary theory, these expenditures are paid to outside 
lawyers because they lend their names, prestige and reputations to certify the quality of 
an issue. 
In theory, both the issuer and underwriter can avail themselves of outside counsel.  
The data show that there are a handful of instances in which the issuer is represented by 
an external law firm and the underwriter is not.  There are many cases in which the 
underwriter is represented by outside counsel but the issuer is not. Finally, we have a 
large number of cases in which both parties are represented by outside counsel. 
Before we continue, we pause to note an important fact concerning the hiring of 
outside counsel in these transactions. For the roughly 1,500 issuances written under New 
York and English laws in the post-war era, the major portion of the deals have at least 
one outside law firm working on the transaction.  The two primary categories of deals are 
those where both the issuer and the underwriters have separate outside counsel (618 
deals) and those where only the underwriter has outside counsel (612 deals).  These data 
suggest that there is a large fraction of deals where the issuer foregoes using outside 
counsel and only the underwriter hires an outside firm.  However, this conclusion ignores 
a peculiar aspect of the sovereign debt market. In this market, the issuer either hires one 
set of outside lawyers for the deal or hires two sets of outside lawyers – one for 
themselves and one for the investment bank. In other words, while as a formal matter, the 
name of the underwriter’s counsel is featured on the issuing materials, these tend to be 
what are called “designated underwriter’s counsel”.  This means that the issuer chooses 
the outside law firm that it wishes to work with the underwriter.  Thus the lawyer 
selection process begins with the issuing sovereign choosing an investment bank to 
underwrite the deal.  The next decision for the sovereign is whether to hire an outside law 
firm to work with the chosen underwriter.  If no underwriter’s counsel is chosen, we 
classify this as a zero-lawyer transaction.  If the issuer selects an outside law firm to work 
                                                        
25
 We assume that using outside counsel is more expensive than just relying on in-house counsel to do the 
work. 
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with the investment bank, then we designate this law firm the underwriter counsel and 
classify the transaction as a one-lawyer deal.  Finally, if the issuer designates both an UC 
and a second outside firm to oversee the transaction, we designate the second law firm as 
issuer counsel and classify the transaction as a two-lawyer transaction.26  
As we show below, the underwriters for any given sovereign’s issuances 
frequently change.  However, the counsel for the underwriter’s side generally remains the 
same (after all, they are chosen by the issuer).  The explanation given for this practice is 
that to be effective, the counsel for the underwriters need to have a good understanding of 
the sovereign’s financial and political condition, and it would be too expensive to have 
new lawyers try to learn the complexities of a sovereign’s situation every time an 
issuance is done, particularly for a sovereign doing frequent issuances.27  To reiterate, in 
deals that have two sets of outside counsel, one for the issuer’s side and one for the 
underwriter’s side, it is the issuer who hires both firms and stipulates a particular role for 
each. 
Information on how much outside lawyers are compensated is difficult to obtain.  
However, based on informal discussions with lawyers who work on these deals, it seems 
                                                        
26
 We have only a few observations in which the issuing sovereign identifies an outside counsel for itself 
but does not hire a law firm to work with the investment bank. 
27
 Unsurprisingly, the practice of the issuer selecting and paying for the counsel on the underwriter side has 
raised conflict of interest issues.  The explanation given in the text is from the New York State Bar Ethics. 
In relevant part, the report explains: 
The appointment of a Designated Underwriters’ Counsel is thought to benefit the 
frequent issuer, underwriters and investors.  Because such counsel works consistently on 
offerings of the issuer’s securities, it becomes particularly familiar with the issuer, and 
thereby better able to make judgments about the information that should be disclosed in 
offering documents.  This familiarity may therefore improve the quality of disclosure in 
offering documents, lower transaction costs and promote the efficiency of the capital 
markets by allowing seasoned issuers to reach the capital markets quickly, as market and 
other opportunities arise.  The ability to reach the capital markets quickly and 
opportunistically is particularly important in the context of so-called “shelf” offerings.  In 
addition, having a single law firm as underwriters’ counsel for frequent issuers rather 
than different firms chosen by the lead underwriter for different offerings gives the issuer 
the benefit of underwriter’s counsel more familiar with the issuer’s business and able to 
update its knowledge more quickly and cost effectively. 
See New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics, Conflicts of Interest: Designated 
Underwriter’s Counsel, Opinion # 818, November 28, 2008 (citation omitted), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&
ContentID=55866.  On this matter, see also Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Notice, Issuer 
Selection Of Underwriters’ Counsel, September 3 1998, available at 
http://www.msrb.org/MSRB1/reports/0299v191/ucounsel.htm; Comment Letter from New York State Bar 
Association on Implementation of Standards for Professional Conduct for Lawyers, December 18, 2002, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/gesbackman1.htm#P73_26356 .    
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safe to say that hiring two elite law firms as outside counsel is the most expensive way to 
do one of these transactions.  Two factors produce higher costs.  First, two law firms are 
involved. Even if they divide the work on the deal, there would be greater transactions 
costs than if the deal were done by just one firm.  But, second, the two law firms do not 
typically divide up the work.  Instead, they stand in opposition to each other, protecting 
different sets of interests – those of the issuer and those of the underwriter. More lawyers 
means more friction, more billable hours and, ultimately, higher costs.   
Our working hypothesis is that there are significant information asymmetries 
between issuers and investors in the sovereign debt market. Economists who have 
examined the asymmetric information problem have focused on investment banks and 
rating agencies as serving as reputational intermediaries.28  Gilson’s thesis suggests that 
lawyers might also play a role.  
 We propose five analyses that address the following three questions:  (1) do 
lawyers serve as reputational intermediaries; (2) if they do, how much value do they add 
in this role; and (3) has their role changed over time. Each of the five analyses defined 
below is imperfect.  Together, however, they shed some light on the questions raised 
above.  
Our dataset covers fifteen different legal systems over a span of roughly two 
hundred years.  We begin our analysis by demonstrating that lawyers in the 19th and early 
20th century had little to nothing to do in the sovereign bond market.  As discussed above, 
the evidence presented by Flandreau et al. shows that the role of gatekeeper in this period 
was filled by investment bankers.  However, as we show below, there was a sea change 
in the two institutions after World War II, and especially after 1980.  Thus, we begin our 
analysis by isolating the time period in which the reputational intermediary hypothesis is 
implausible.  The subsequent analyses then focus on the subsets of the data in which the 
hypothesis is plausible. 
  
4.2. The Analyses 
4.2.1.   Names on Documents   
                                                        
28
 See Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard and Nieto-Parra [30], Flandreau and Flores [28] [29].  
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In this section, we examine if and when sovereign issuers began advertising the 
identities of their lawyers to their investors.  If sovereigns are not touting the lawyers who 
worked on the issuance, then it is unlikely that the lawyers are serving any sort of 
signaling function. In other words, if we do not find the lawyers being advertised, we can 
reject the reputational intermediary story out of hand.29 
Based on our time series of issuances, there appears to be a difference in the role 
of lawyers before and after World War II.   Lawyers do not appear to have played a 
reputational intermediary role in the pre-World War II data (1823-1945). Of the 614 
issuances from the pre-war period, the identities of the lawyers are mentioned only 16 
times and five of those are for the same issuer, Germany.  Thus, law firms are mentioned 
in only 2.61 percent of the issues in our pre-war subset.  Perhaps more telling, when 
lawyers are mentioned during this period, there is usually an explicit explanation for 
mentioning them in the offering materials. In 12 out of the 16 instances where lawyers 
were mentioned, the lawyers were mentioned simply to tell investors that, if they wished 
to examine background documents, those materials would be available at the offices of 
the named lawyers.  This is in contrast to the manner in which lawyers are mentioned in 
the post-World War II data, where their names are frequently mentioned prominently on 
the back cover of the sales documents as having worked on the deal. 
The marginal role that lawyers played in the pre-war period is illustrated in the 
first sovereign bond that we found that mentions lawyers.  This bond was issued by the 
Confederate States of America in 1863 and is known as the Cotton Bond. The bonds 
carried a 7 percent interest rate and matured when all hostilities had ceased.  The bonds 
were convertible into cotton at $12 per bale.  At the time of issuance, cotton was selling 
for twice that amount, thanks mostly to the Union blockade, and was steadily on the rise. 
Although it was sold at a discount (30 percent), the issue was oversubscribed. 
Disputes over the quality of the cotton to be delivered at maturity were 
anticipated.  The bonds had an arbitration provision that allowed for disputes over cotton 
quality to be adjudicated by an arbitral panel.  After describing the arbitral panel, one 
                                                        
29
 The fact that the identity of lawyers is being advertised in the issuance documents does not, by itself, 
mean that the issuers are renting the reputations of the lawyers.  It may, for example, be that the lawyers are 
trying to advertise themselves.   We cannot disprove that possibility.  Our point though is that the absence 
of any mention of the lawyers on the deal indicates that they are probably not adding reputational value.  
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member to be appointed by each side and an umpire to be appointed thereafter, the bond 
then names the lawyers who will handle the administrative matters; the firm of London 
solicitors, Messrs. Freshfields and Newman.30 Freshfields & Newman was a pre-eminent 
law firm, having represented the Bank of England since the mid 1700s.31  From the 
language in the bond, it is clear that the only reason that the lawyers are mentioned is to 
invite investors to visit the firm if they would like to examine a certified copy of the Act 
of Congress that approved the conditions of the bond.  Figure 1 is a reproduction of the 
bond.  As an aside, another eminent London law firm was also involved in the deal, 
Crowder, Maynard, Son & Lawford, and it was not mentioned at all.32  By contrast, the 
bankers, Emile Erlanger & Co. and J. Henry Schroeder & Co have their names 
prominently displayed both on the sides of the bonds and at the bottom. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
   
Starting in late 1946, immediately after the war, the names of law firms began to 
appear in the sales documents as a regular matter, and independent of any administrative 
or legal function that they might be performing. Indeed it is not until 1956 that we find 
the first post-war sovereign issuance where outside counsel is not mentioned.  There have 
been a number of changes or shocks to the sovereign debt market that might explain the 
enhanced role of lawyers in the post-war era. First, the depression that preceded World 
War II produced perhaps the biggest crisis that the sovereign debt market will ever see, 
with roughly 40 percent of sovereign issuers defaulting over the period 1929-1937.33 
Second, in the wake of World War II, the global financial system was significantly 
altered with the establishment of the Bretton Woods Agreement and its attendant 
institutions.  
The bulk of the sovereign bonds in our sample (82.4%) in the post-World War II 
era were issued under either New York or English law. (See Figure 2 and Table 2.) Of the 
                                                        
30
 See 7 Per Cent Cotton Loan, Confederate States of America, 1863. 
31
 See Bennett [9]. 
32
 Almost none of the innumerable discussions of the civil war financing mentions the lawyers, let alone 
any reputational role they may have played. E.g., Foote [34], Weidenmier [62], Gentry [39].  
33
 See Flandreau, Gaillard and Panizza [32]. While there was an initial impetus towards SEC regulation of 
sovereign issuances in the U.S. in the wake of the many sovereign defaults during the depression, this 
waned in the post-World War II era.  See Batlan [7].  
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remaining, the majority were issued under German law (8.5 percent of the total sample), 
with fewer issued under Austrian, Swiss, Luxembourg, French, Spanish, Dutch, 
Portuguese, Japanese, and Italian laws.  Many nations also issue bonds that are governed 
by local law and are primarily sold to domestic investors. However, the asymmetric 
information problems with bonds written under local law are likely minimal. Citizens 
have the power to vote their governments out of office and also probably have better 
information.  Therefore, we do not include bonds written under local law in our dataset. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Figure 3 and Table 2 show the number of bonds issued under each of the different 
types of laws that explicitly mention lawyers.  Note the difference between the two high-
volume jurisdictions (New York law and English law) and the other jurisdictions.  In 
almost all of our bonds governed by English and New York law (over 97 percent), the 
identities of one or both of the law firms are mentioned prominently in the offering 
materials.  In contrast, in the majority of the small jurisdiction issuances, such as those 
under German, French, or Luxembourg law (over 85 percent), the identities of the 
lawyers are not mentioned.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3] 
 
These data suggest that to the extent lawyers are operating as reputational 
intermediaries, they do so primarily in the two largest markets, New York and London, 
and only in the post-war period.  In the smaller markets, advertising the identities of the 
lawyers is perhaps viewed as adding less value.  We have been given at least three 
explanations from practitioners for the “no lawyer mentioned” phenomenon in the 
smaller markets.  First, it may be that these markets are more heavily regulated than 
either New York or London and investors therefore do not need additional certification. 
Second, perhaps the small size of these markets means that there are no more than a 
handful of firms who could work on large cross-border financial transactions, thereby 
obviating the need for disclosure of their identities. Third, it may be that the only issuers 
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tapping these smaller markets are either the higher rated issuers or those with close ties to 
the national markets in which they are issuing.  Consequently, defaults against the 
investors in these jurisdictions are unlikely.  
In sum, the data from the post-war period suggest two conclusions. First, that the 
reputational intermediary story, to the extent it holds, is most plausible in the modern era.  
Second, even in the modern era, there is variation across jurisdictions.  The reputational 
story may hold in the New York and London markets, where the identities of the lawyers 
are prominently signaled in the sales materials.  But it is less plausible in the other, 
smaller, markets, such as Frankfurt and Paris.  
4.2.2.  Long-Term Relationships 
Our second set of analyses is based on the definition of a reputational 
intermediary.  In our view, a reputational intermediary is an entity that helps solve the 
asymmetric information problem between issuers and investors.  The basic problem is 
that information about a complex entity such as a sovereign is hard to observe.  The 
incentives of the sovereign debtor to maintain its reputation do not fully solve this 
problem because of an inherent agency conflict.  The governments (the agents who run 
the sovereigns) are typically short-term players and, therefore, investors have reason to be 
suspicious about their claims.  This problem can be solved, however, if the sovereign 
issuer hires an intermediary who can certify the sovereign’s information; that is, an 
intermediary who itself has a reputation to maintain.  Investment banks and law firms, it 
has been suggested, are among the institutions that can perform this role.  In order to 
perform this role, they presumably have developed long-term relationships with the 
sovereign issuers.  There are at least two reasons for this.  First, their long-term 
relationships help them acquire specialized information about sovereigns.34  Second, to 
the extent that their access to future employment depends on their performance vis-à-vis 
investors on prior deals, they have an incentive to ensure that their sovereign clients 
provide accurate disclosures and representations. 
Based on the foregoing, we examine the data on law firms and investment banks 
with respect to the length of their relationships with issuers.  We construct a simple 
measure of the rate at which sovereign issuers change their bankers or lawyers from deal 
                                                        
34
 See Buchheit [13]. 
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to deal.  If a sovereign changes these agents from deal to deal, then there is obviously no 
long-term relationship.  If, on the other hand, issuers hire the same law firm or investment 
bank on every deal, then there is reason to believe that these entities have access to 
privileged information and are in a position to certify the quality of the issue.   
For each issuance by a sovereign, we count the number of times its lawyers or 
underwriters change from the prior deal.  If there is a change, we count that as a 1 and if 
there is no change from one deal to the next, we count that as a 0.  Over a given time 
period and set of deals, therefore, we have estimates of the rates at which sovereigns 
change the various intermediaries who work on their deals.  Typically, there are two sets 
of lead lawyers on any deal (issuer’s counsel and underwriter’s counsel) and one set of 
lead bankers (the managing underwriter).  We consider the relationships between bankers 
and issuers first.  
As described previously, there are almost no deals in which lawyers were used in 
the pre-World War II period.  Hence, there is nothing to measure in this time period 
regarding law firms. However, we can examine the extent of the relationships between 
issuers and investment banks in the pre and post-World War II periods.  Figures 4 and 5 
illustrate the comparative numbers.  In Figures 6 and 7, we separate the sovereign 
issuances according to the legal jurisdictions under which they were written.  As seen in 
these figures, there is a difference between the issuer-bank relationships in the pre- and 
post-war periods.  In the pre-war period, issuers tended to stay with the same banks.  This 
finding is consistent with the research by economic historians on firms such as the 
Rothschilds, Barings, Credit Lyonnais and Paribas, who tended to have strong 
relationships with their sovereign clients.  In the post-war period, however, the issuer-
bank relationships became significantly weaker.  As Figure 5 shows, this is particularly 
so, beginning around 1980 through 2012.  Until around the 1978-1982 period, we see 
relatively long lasting investment bank-issuer relationships.  This is evidenced by the 
smaller number of changes in investment bankers per deal done as compared to the post-
1982 period.35  In other words, issuers tend to use the same underwriters over and over, 
until around 1980-1982, after which the duration of banker-issuer relationships shortens. 
                                                        
35
 We calculate the number of changes in bankers divided by the number of opportunities for change.  The 
denominator is the number of deals minus 1 (the number of opportunities for change). 
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[Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5] 
 
[Insert Figure 6 and Figure 7] 
 
The Latin American debt crisis may provide an explanation for this change. The 
crisis hit the hardest in the early 1980s. One of the problems that the crisis revealed was 
that a number of western banks had become severely overexposed to particular Latin 
American countries. Significant pressure was then brought by regulators on the banks to 
induce them to diversify their portfolios.36  What the data might be showing, therefore, is 
a manifestation of those pressures – with the financial institutions getting out of the 
business of building long-term relationships with sovereign issuers and lawyers filling the 
void.  
Table 3 reports the Z-statistics of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test that confirm 
the suggestion from Figures 4 and 5.  Table 3 reports the comparative numbers using two 
different break points.  First, it reports the comparison in terms of the pre and post-war 
data (1946 being the break point) and then reports the comparison in terms of the pre and 
post-Latin American debt crisis (1982 being the break point).  Between 1946 and 1982 
little activity took place in the sovereign bond markets (Flandreau et al. call it the 
“sleeping beauty” period of the sovereign bond markets), so the two sets of comparisons 
show similar results.37  For each of the comparisons in Table 3, we report two different 
specifications.  In the first specification, we simply compare the numbers of deals before 
and after our specified break points. The results confirm the visual impression given in 
Figures 4 and 5 that investment bankers changed more often in the past (whether we look 
at pre 1946 or pre 1982) than in the modern era.  In the second specification, we separate 
the deals in terms of the markets in which they were executed.  Starting in roughly the 
early 1900s, many sovereign issuers began issuing in multiple markets. Previously 
sovereigns tended to issue bonds in only one jurisdiction.  For those issuances, it was 
                                                        
36
 On the Latin American debt crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, see Cline [19].  
37
 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is a nonparametric test that measures if two groups come from the 
same distribution. In this case the results suggest that there is a statistically significant difference between 
the pre and post-World War II distributions of long-term relationships between issuers and underwriters. 
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sometimes the case that they would have to hire different investment banks for the 
separate jurisdictions.  This was particularly so if their primary banker did not have 
operations in multiple jurisdictions.  The Confederate bond we examined earlier is an 
example of this – the Confederacy used Emile Erlanger & Co. in Paris for an issuance in 
francs and J. Henry Schroeder in London for an issuance in pounds sterling.  Since the 
pre-war contracts did not specify governing laws, we separate the data by currency of 
issuance. The results are consistent with the first specification, albeit stronger.  Consistent 
with the work of Flandreau et al., the data indicate a shift from a market where 
underwriters served as reputational intermediaries (the pre-war market and extending to 
the end of the 1970s) to one where they did not (the era starting in about 1982).38   
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Flandreau et al. follow their observation regarding the disappearance of 
investment bankers as reputational intermediaries in the modern era by asking the 
question "what types of entities substituted for investment banks;” after all, the 
asymmetric information problem didn’t disappear at the end of this time period.  They 
suggest that rating agencies may have filled the void. 39   That may be a partial 
explanation.  The question we are asking is whether law firms may have also emerged as 
substitutes for the bankers in playing the reputational intermediary role.  
 
[Insert Figure 8 and Figure 9] 
 
Figures 8 and 9 show the rate of change for issuer’s and underwriter’s counsel, 
respectively, in the post-war period.  The strength of the relationships between lawyers 
and issuers in comparison to the relatively weak relationships between bankers and 
issuers during this same period is striking (See Table 4 and 5). The data show the lawyers 
who work on a sovereign’s debt issuances rarely change.  
 
                                                        
38
 See Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard and Nieto-Para [30]. 
39
 See id.; see also Flandreau, Gaillard and Packer [31].  
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[Insert Table 4 and Table 5] 
 
Based on these results, we are left with an initial indication that law firms might 
have replaced bankers as reputational intermediaries in the post-war period. Flandreau et 
al. may be right about the enhanced role of rating agencies during the post-war period; 
but our results suggest the possibility that lawyers may also be part of the story.  An 
aspect of these results that is important is the designated underwriter counsel 
phenomenon mentioned earlier. This phenomenon shows up in the data on investment 
bankers and investment banker’s counsel, where we see that even though the investment 
bankers who are lead managers on the deals for a particular sovereign change frequently, 
the investment banker’s lawyers remain the same.  
As Figures 5 and 9 illustrate, there is a difference in the strength of the banker-
issuer relationship and the banker’s lawyer-issuer relationships. At first cut, this looks 
puzzling. The closeness of the relationships between bankers and issuers and banker’s 
lawyers and issuers should be the same or at least similar.  After all, one would presume 
that the bankers would hire their own lawyers.  Yet, what we see, particularly after 
around 1980, are short duration relationships between sovereign issuers and their 
bankers, but long duration relationships between those same sovereign issuers and the 
banker’s lawyers.  What we are seeing is the manifestation of the practice of utilizing 
“designated underwriter counsel” – where the issuer chooses an outside law firm and 
designates them to work on the underwriter’s side. The emergence of this phenomenon is 
important for our purposes.  The fact that the investment banker tolerates the issuer 
choosing the investment banker’s law firm might be an indication that a portion of the 
gatekeeper role has been passed to the lawyers. 
4.2.3. Two Lawyers versus One 
As noted earlier, the sovereign issuances in our database written under New York 
and English law fall into two types.  On the one hand there are those issuances where two 
sets of outside law firms work on the transaction, in adversarial capacities (one for the 
issuer and the other for the underwriter).  On the other hand there are transactions in 
which only one set of outside lawyers are involved. If the outside law firms being hired 
on these deals are operating primarily as reputational intermediaries, then we should see 
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differences between the types of issuers using two outside law firms versus one.  And we 
do. 
Table 2 reports the statistics on the one versus two lawyer distributions in the 
period 1946-2012 for 1,063 issuances.  The first panel pertains to the full sample.  Of the 
high-rated issuances (investment grade), roughly 30 percent use two outside law firms.  
The majority of these issuances (over 50 percent) use only one outside law firm.  The 
numbers are reversed if we look at the patterns for non-investment grade issuers.  In this 
subsample, over 75 percent of the issuances use two outside law firms and fewer than 15 
percent use only one outside law firm (See Figure 10). 
 
[Insert Figure 10] 
 
We next break the data down into New York and English law subgroups.  In prior 
work, we found that stronger issuers have tended to use the English market and weaker 
ones the New York market.40 It also could be the case that the difference between the use 
of one or two law firms is due to the different quality of bonds or the different legal 
cultures in New York versus London.  The second and third panels of Table 2 suggest 
that this is not the case.  In both markets we find that non-investment grade issuers are 
more likely to use two outside law firms.  Investment grade issuers are more likely to use 
one outside law firm.  That said, there are differences in the patterns across the markets 
— the preference for two-lawyer deals by non-investment grade issuers is stronger in the 
New York market than in the English market.  The reverse applies for the investment 
grade issuers and their preference for one-lawyer deals (the preference is more distinct in 
the English market).  Figures 11 and 12 illustrate these patterns.  Figure 11 reports the 
number of lawyers working on deals with bonds written under New York law (which is 
dominated by non-investment grade issuers).  The figure shows a larger fraction of two-
lawyer deals through the period 1980-2012 (prior to 1980, most of the issuances were by 
investment grade issuers).  Figure 12 reports the number of lawyers working on deals 
involving bonds written under English law, which is dominated by investment grade 
issuers, and shows the converse – a dominance of one-lawyer deals. 
                                                        
40
 See Bradley and Gulati [12]. 
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[Insert Figure 11 and Figure 12] 
 
Table 6 provides a different perspective.  It reports on the patterns of lawyer use 
for the highest volume (by number of deals) issuers.  The two halves of the table report 
the number of sovereigns using two law firms on most of their deals and the number 
reporting on the sovereigns using one law firm on most of their deals.   The patterns are 
distinct, as the final column, in particular, reveals.  The top issuers using two outside law 
firms are almost all below investment grade.  The top issuers using one outside law firm 
are almost all investment grade. 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
In sum, the behavior of sovereigns in terms of how many outside counsel they 
hire varies as a function of their reputations as debtors (bond rating).  Those with lower 
ratings typically hire two outside law firms for their deals.  Those with higher ratings 
typically hire one outside law firm.  And, as mentioned at the outset, those issuers with 
the highest reputations (like the United States and Germany) generally utilize no outside 
law firms on their issuances.  Given that the deals do not vary significantly in terms of the 
technical legal work that needs to be done, something else is likely going on in terms of 
the hiring of outside counsel. Two possibilities remain.  One the one hand, perhaps the 
weaker issuers perceive a greater need to hire certifiers (two certifiers as opposed to one).  
On the other hand, it may be that the weaker issuers are more worried about being sued or 
having assets attached and, therefore, need good lawyers on hand to protect against any 
legal issues that might arise.   
As discussed above, it is possible that two outside law firms on a deal would add 
more reputational value than only having one firm (the Gilsonian thesis doesn’t 
distinguish between issuer’s counsel and underwriter’s counsel).  When we discussed this 
premise with practitioners though, some suggested an alternative explanation.  The 
alternate story is that the move to two-lawyer deals in the mid-1990s and thereafter was 
because weaker issuers, after the crises of the mid-1990s, realized that they could no 
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longer afford to have the lawyers for the underwriters set all the terms of the deal; and 
particularly not the terms governing how the bonds would be restructured if that became 
necessary.  Allowing underwriter’s counsel to draft contracts in the absence of a 
meaningful issuer counsel presence is well and good for strong issuers like Norway and 
Sweden.  Those issuers do not face any meaningful likelihood of default.  However, 
allowing underwriter’s counsel to set the contract terms is too costly for sovereigns who 
perceive a meaningful risk of default and subsequent litigation.  
4.2.4. Reputation of Lawyers and the Reputation of Sovereign Issuers 
 
In this section we examine the relation between lawyers' reputation and the 
reputation of issuers. We examine whether the high-reputation lawyers tend to limit their 
representation to high-reputation issuers, as tends to be the case in the corporate market.41   
Based on the evidence from the corporate bond market, one might expect that the top 
reputational intermediaries would be careful to not associate themselves with anything 
but the top rated issuers.  That is the basic idea behind gatekeeping; the weaker and less 
credible are not allowed to pass through the gates without proper certification.  Thus, if 
the top law firms are playing a reputational intermediary role, we should see them 
limiting their client lists to the strongest issuers – the ones they have investigated and can 
certify that the offering is of high quality.  
Our proxy for lawyer quality is market share.42  We assume that the top law firm 
acting as issuer counsel and underwriter counsel represent the high-quality law firms. 
Cleary Gottlieb dominates the market for issuer counsel for bonds written under both 
New York and English law, with market shares of 26% and 6%, respectively. Sullivan & 
Cromwell dominates the underwriter counsel with an overall market share of 18% and a 
market share of 31% of those bonds written under New York law. 
Table 7 reports the relations between the quality of the lawyers based on market 
share and the quality of the bonds they issue.  We divide the sample of bonds into two 
                                                        
41
 E.g., Fang [24], Livingston and Miller [49]. 
42
 Market share is a commonly used measure of reputation, particularly when adequate substitute measures 
are not available.  E.g., Fang [24], Megginson and Weiss [50]. In the sovereign context, we are unaware of 
any rankings of global law firms in terms of the quality of their sovereign practices.  In the context of other 
research, we have spoken extensively to practitioners and examined the memberships on key international 
law reform committees for sovereign debt issues.  The law firms who have the largest market share are the 
ones considered by practitioners to have the highest quality members who, in turn, also tend to be on major 
law reform committees.  E.g., Gelpern and Gulati [38], Gulati and Scott [42].        
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groups: those issues with an S&P rating of B- or lower (non-investment grade) and those 
with ratings higher than B- (investment grade).  
In Table 7 we report the percentage of issuer counsel and investment bank 
counsel by jurisdiction and by bond rating.  The table shows that the majority of bonds 
overseen by Cleary Gottlieb, the top issuer counsel, are non-investment grade: 67% of the 
total and 64% and 73% for New York law and English law bonds, respectively.  
Similarly, the majority of deals in which the top underwriter counsel, Sullivan & 
Cromwell, participated were non-investment grade bonds.  Note that this pattern does not 
hold in the market for English law bonds. However, Sullivan & Cromwell worked on 
only 3 deals on bonds written under English law. In sum, the results in Table 7 refute the 
notion that high-quality lawyers represent high-quality sovereign issues.  Apparently, 
high-rated issuers do not find the need to hire the most prestigious law firms. It is the 
weaker issuers who manifest this need.  
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
The patterns we find for both issuer and underwriter counsel are at odds with the 
predictions from the reputational intermediary theory because the data reveal a negative 
relation between the reputation of the issuer law firms and the quality of the issuances 
that they oversee.  High-reputation law firms work with weaker issuers and low-
reputation law firms work with stronger issuers.  If we assume that the higher-reputation 
firms are the ones that charge higher rates, this means that the stronger issuers are willing 
to spend less on legal fees than their weaker counterparts.  These results appear stronger 
still, if one recollects the fact that the strongest issuers (the AAA issuers like the U.S., 
Denmark, France, etc.) do their sovereign issuances without any lawyers at all. In sum, 
we find that the strong issuers have no need to rely on outside law firms for their stamp of 
approval. It is the weak issuers who hire top lawyers.  Perhaps this is because they 
anticipate more trouble in the future than strong issuers.  If so, our results are more 
consistent with the traditional conception of lawyers as people one goes to when one is in 
trouble, rather than lawyers as reputational intermediaries.  
4.2.5. Cost of Capital 
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Our final empirical exercise is an examination of the effects of the choice of 
underwriters’ and issuers’ counsel on the cost of capital.  Table 8 report the results of 
OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the spread between the stated rate and 
the rate on a U.S. Treasury Bond with the same maturity.43   Results are presented for all 
jurisdictions (Cols. 1-3), New York law (Cols. 4-6) and English law (Cols. 7-9).   
The results reported in first column in the each of the samples (Cols.1, 4, and 7) 
include all independent variables. We divide the bond ratings into six categories (AAA, 
AA, A, BBB, BB, B) and combine ratings of pluses and minuses into these respective six 
categories.  Category BBB is our hold out rating.  Thus, we expect that all ratings above 
BBB will have negative coefficients and all below positive ones – and they do.  The 
control variables include the issue’s size, maturity and the number of banks in the 
underwriting syndicate. The regressions include year and currency fixed effects and 
standard errors that are clustered by country.44   
The coefficients on the ratings categories are monotonic and all but a few are 
statistically significant.  No other independent variable is statistically significant. 
The data reported in columns 2, 5, and 7 exclude the ratings dummies.  Aside 
from a negative relation between Amount and Spread the only other independent variable 
that is significant is the dummy variable for issuances involving two law firms.  
Consistent with our previous discussion and empirical evidence, the sign of this 
coefficient is positive, suggesting that hiring two lawyers yields a higher cost of debt 
relative to hiring one lawyer, which is the un-coded category.  Note that this relation is 
significant for the U.S. sample, and non-existent in the English sample. Note also that the 
dummy variables are insignificant when ratings are included in the model.  This is not 
                                                        
43
 Discussions with practitioners suggest that, because of complications arising from tax treatment, 
sovereign bonds of the type that we examine (foreign law governed) are almost always issued at par.  That 
said, researchers have found instances where sovereigns have tried to manipulate the coupon rates on the 
face of their bonds to help satisfy external benchmarks (e.g., imposed by the IMF or the Maastricht Treaty) 
Dias et al. [23].  These manipulations can occur in a variety of ways, including adjusting the fees paid to 
financial institutions, using implicit guarantees from third parties, and issuing the bonds at a discount. 
While our understanding is that the coupon rate manipulation in particular is rare in the context of the 
foreign law bonds, our analysis is vulnerable to the criticism that we have not fully corrected for them.  
44
 Our sample consists of those sovereigns who chose to issue bonds at a particular time.  Presumably, there 
were sovereigns who considered issuing bonds at the same time but decided not to do so.  All regressions 
were re-run with the Inverse Mills ratio, which corrects for this bias. None of our results are affected by the 
inclusion this variable. 
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surprising, since according to our earlier findings, there is a negative relation between 
ratings and the number of lawyers.     
Finally, Columns 3, 6 and 9 report regressions in which only two parameters are 
estimated:  a dummy variable equal to 1 if the issue had Issuer Counsel and a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the issue involved no lawyers.  Under this specification, the 
estimates of the former imply a higher cost of capital in all three samples – the total, New 
York law and English law.  As detailed above, in the majority of cases, if an issuer hires 
an outside counsel then that lawyer is most likely to be the underwriter counsel as well.  
Consequently this variable captures the effect of having 2 lawyers as opposed to 1. The 
estimated coefficient is highly significant and material.  The t-statistic is greater than 3 
and the estimate is greater than 100 basis points in all three samples.  Moreover, 
consistent with the above, the coefficient on the No Lawyer dummy is negative, 
indicating a significantly lower cost of capital.   
 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
To summarize, we find consistent evidence that the cost of capital to a sovereign 
is lower when there are no outside lawyers involved in the transaction compared to 
issuances involving only one-lawyer. Moreover we find that relative to the cost of capital 
in one-lawyer transactions, issuances involving two law firms result in a higher cost of 
capital. The implication of these results is either: (1) lawyers create costs which are 
reflected in the rate the sovereigns are required to pay; or (2) the presence of lawyers 
suggests that litigation is a real possibility, especially for risky (non-investment) grade 
debt.  Seeing no direct link between underwriter and lawyer fees and the interest rate that 
sovereigns face in the market, we suspect the latter. By our interpretation of the evidence, 
only weaker sovereigns have an incentive to hire outside counsel.  Moreover, when the 
issuer hires not only an underwriter counsel but retains a law firm to protect its interests 
in negotiating with the underwriter, i.e., an issuer counsel, the cost of capital increases 
even more.  This suggests that investors become skeptical when there are two law firms 
working on a deal and they respond accordingly by demanding a higher interest rate. 
However, as we discuss in the conclusion, this is a matter for further research. 
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5.  Conclusion 
Research by Marc Flandreau and others indicate that underwriters have ceased to 
play a gatekeeping role in the sovereign debt markets in the modern era.  This raises the 
question of whether law firms might have stepped in to fill the role previously played by 
underwriters.  
Consistent with the findings of Flandreau et al., we document a sea change in the 
relationship between sovereign issuers and outside law firms.  Prior to WW II, lawyers 
were nowhere to be found in the sovereign debt market. But after the war, law firms 
began to get involved in the issuance process.  Our initial premise was that lawyers 
replaced investment banks as the gatekeepers of this market. The evidence suggests that 
this is not the case.  Rather, the results suggest that it is the rating agencies that have 
stepped in to fill the void left by investment banks,   
Our results have implications for the role that lawyers play in this market. We 
show, in a number of different ways, that the hiring of lawyers correlates with an increase 
in the cost of capital. Hiring one law firm increases the cost of capital and hiring two law 
firms increases the cost of capital even more.  So, the question is, why would any 
sovereign issuer hire a law firm?  The answer, we suspect, has to do with the types of 
firms that are hiring outside law firms.  The evidence indicates that the weaker the issuer, 
the greater the need for outside lawyers.   
The timing of the shift towards two-lawyer deals reinforces our suspicion.  The 
first instance of a two-lawyer issuance in our data comes as early as 1963 in an issuance 
by Japan (Milbank Tweed was the first issuer’s counsel to show up explicitly on a 
sovereign bond deal).  In 1964, there are three more two-lawyer issuances, by Austria, 
Japan and Norway. However, employing two law firms does not become prevalent until 
the mid-1990s (roughly 1996-98); and when it does, the impetus comes from the big 
Latin American issuers such as Mexico and Brazil. The 1995-98 period is significant in 
sovereign debt history because it is the period that covers both the Tequila crisis in 
Mexico (1995) and the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-98).  In addition to the crises though, 
this period also witnessed a significant expansion in both the number of deals being done 
and the types of issuers doing them.  Crucially, many more low-rated sovereign issuers 
entered the markets. Perhaps the combination of multiple financial crises in the mid-
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1990s and the expansion in the types of issuers increased the need for mechanisms that 
provided enhanced credibility. The data in Figures 11 and 12 show that in the 1950s and 
1960s, the fraction of deals using two law firms was 0, and while the number increases in 
the 1970s and 1980s, the number of deals involving two sets of law firms was only in the 
10-20 percent range.  The big change in terms of these types of deals constituting the 
majority of all deals being done begins around the mid to late 1990s.  By 2011, the 
fraction of deals using two outside law firms was over 75 percent of all the sovereign 
issuances written under New York and English law. 
The question then becomes what happened as a result of the crisis period of the 
mid-1990s that caused this apparent enhanced need for lawyers. The historical record 
suggests two related changes that occurred that may have impacted the need for lawyers, 
and in particular the need for lawyers on the issuer side for the weakest sovereign issuers.  
First, the mid-1990s is when we observe the emergence of the modern vulture creditor.  
That is, a creditor who holds out and refuses a sovereign’s restructuring offer and then 
sues in court for the full amount.  In earlier eras, holding out would have been a largely 
pointless exercise, since the sovereign, with its lawyers and large resource base, could 
simply outlast the creditors.  In the mid-1990s a new type of creditor emerged – one with 
the resources and litigation skills to be able to take on a sovereign debtor in court and, on 
occasion, even win. It is in 1995-96 that the first major vulture victory occurred with the 
litigation by the Styrofoam magnate Kenneth Dart against Brazil (Dart is rumored to have 
made upwards of $1 billion from the eventual settlement).45  Following on the heels of 
that decision was a series of litigations led by the billionaire Paul Singer’s hedge fund, 
Elliott Associates, against countries like Panama, Peru, Congo and Argentina.46  Today, 
there are numerous such hedge funds in existence – each with sophisticated sovereign 
litigators on hand.  The historical evidence suggests, therefore, that it might be the 
enhanced need for sovereigns to have protection against litigation by vulture creditors 
                                                        
45
 The litigation was in 1995.  CIBC Bank and Trust Co. (Cayman), Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. 
Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). See also Schumacher, Trebesch and Enderlein [57].  
46
 These cases are described in Blackmun and Mukhi [10].  
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that produced the need for issuer’s counsel; a need that emerges full blown only in the 
mid-1990s.47 
The second and related change that also, arguably, helped enhance the need for 
lawyers was the increased reluctance by official sector institutions (e.g., the IMF) to 
provide bailouts for sovereigns in trouble.  This, in turn, meant that sovereign debtors 
who were in trouble had to come up with creative ways to engineer restructurings within 
the context of the debt contracts that they had agreed to.  Put simply, the terms of the 
contracts the sovereigns had signed started becoming increasingly important.  Starting in 
the late 1990s, a number of weaker sovereign issuers began having to do restructurings, 
with little or no official sector assistance (other than a “do it yourself” exhortation from 
institutions like the IMF).  Pakistan, Ukraine, and Ecuador were among the early movers, 
whose experiences taught the rest of the market that having lawyers who knew how to 
work with contract terms was important; at least for the weaker issuers.48 
To summarize, our results indicate that sovereigns increasingly turned to law 
firms in the post-World War II period, and especially so in the mid-1990s.  Part of this 
trend is due to the increased perceptions of risk after crises such as the Latin American 
crisis of the 1980s.  But the most significant part of the story, we conjecture, relates to the 
enhanced litigation risk that sovereign issuers began to face starting in the mid-1990s.49 
Before concluding, we note a couple of caveats. 
First, our analysis has focused on the demand side of this market. However, 
supply side effects might be at play as well.  The structure of the modern law firm has 
evolved significantly over the 200 year period that we examine, going from associations 
with no more than a few lawyers in the 19th century, to relatively small firms in the early 
20th century, to the mega firms of the 1990s and thereafter (Galanter and Palay [35], 
Wilkins [63]).  And while many of those developments were likely client-demand driven, 
it is hard to fully separate those from the effects of things like the major changes in 
communication, transportation, and regulatory philosophies that took place over that 
                                                        
47
 For more on vulture litigation against sovereigns, see Allegaert [2], Fisch and Gentile [27], Alfaro, 
Ahmed and Maurer [1]. Thompson and Runciman [61], Gulati and Scott [42].  
48
 For details, see Sturzeneger and Zettelmeyer [60], Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch [20]. 
49
 Meaningful litigation against sovereigns became possible in the U.S. and U.K., in theory, in the late 
1970s, after the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in the U.S. in 1976 and the State 
Immunities Act in the U.K. in 1976.  However, it took a decade and a half for specialist firms to emerge 
that had the financial resources and litigation skills to conduct effective litigations against sovereigns.   
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period. A fuller study could incorporate the impact of supply side developments into the 
sovereign debt market.  For our purposes though, the most relevant portion of our 
analysis is our empirical inquiry over the period 1990-2011, in which we examine the 
differences between sovereigns hiring either zero, one or two large elite law firms.  In 
this context, because we are essentially looking at choices made by different sovereign 
issuers contemporaneously, the supply side is not particularly relevant (it affects both 
sides of the analysis in the same way). 
 Second, our interpretation of the evidence may be changing even as we write this 
in August 2013. At this time, the sovereign debt markets are in turmoil. The past couple 
of years have not only witnessed a major crisis in the sovereign debt markets (the Euro 
area crisis), but have also seen the biggest sovereign debt restructuring in history (Greece, 
in March 201250) and one of the most effective litigations against a sovereign (NML v. 
Argentina, in October 201251).  Based on the findings in this paper, we may be on the 
cusp of seeing another significant change in the roles played by lawyers in sovereign debt 
transactions.  
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Table 1: Top 50 Issuers 
 
 
Countries 1800 – 1944 1945 – 2012 1980 - 2012 Total
Argentina 59 52 52 111
Australia 28 37 15 65
Austria 6 30 25 36
Belgium 9 61 58 70
Brazil 23 48 40 71
Canada 21 9 3 30
Chile 21 11 10 32
China 38 14 14 52
Colombia 9 32 25 41
Costa Rica 6 9 9 15
Croatia 0 18 18 18
Cyprus 2 12 12 14
Czech 6 10 10 16
Denmark 3 36 25 39
El Salvador 1 14 11 15
Finland 4 65 60 69
France 16 2 0 18
Germany 27 8 2 35
Greece 8 48 48 56
Hungary 4 13 13 17
Iceland 3 30 30 33
Indonesia 0 11 10 11
Ireland 4 28 24 32
Italy 6 50 45 56
Jamaica 4 21 19 25
Japan 22 33 16 55
Korea 0 11 11 11
Lebanon 0 21 21 21
Lithuania 0 20 20 20
Malaysia 0 19 15 19
Mexico 9 67 55 76
New Zealand 12 23 17 35
Norway 10 39 12 49
Panama 4 22 20 26
Peru 5 9 9 14
Philippines 0 46 42 46
Poland 6 28 28 34
Portugal 2 48 45 50
Romania 6 6 6 12
Russia 17 17 17 34
South Africa 13 32 19 45
Spain 2 14 14 16
Sweden 11 54 49 65
Tunisie 0 10 10 10
Turkey 3 50 50 53
United Kingdom 71 7 7 78
Uruguay 6 26 26 32
Venezuela 0 35 30 35
Other countries 105 173 169 278
Total 612 1479 1286 2091
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Table 2: Number of lawyers by law and sovereign bond rating, 1946 – 2012 
 
 
 
  
# of 
lawyers
Total
Number % Number %
0 41 8.74% 110 14.65% 151
1 63 13.43% 425 56.59% 488
2 365 77.83% 216 28.76% 581
Total 469 100.00% 751 100.00% 1220
0 2 0.67% 1 0.51% 3
1 17 5.70% 83 42.13% 100
2 279 93.62% 113 57.36% 392
Total 298 100.00% 197 100.00% 495
0 1 0.90% 9 2.37% 10
1 37 33.33% 284 74.93% 321
2 73 65.77% 86 22.69% 159
Total 111 100.00% 379 100.00% 490
0 30 81.08% 56 90.32% 86
1 4 10.81% 6 9.68% 10
2 3 8.11% 0 0.00% 3
Total 37 100.00% 62 100.00% 99
Investment grade
All Sample
New York 
Law
English 
Law
German 
Law
Non investment grade
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Table 3: Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for  
Investment Banks 
 
 
 
 
  
Pre-WWII 
dummy obs rank sum expected
Pre-WWII 
dummy obs rank sum expected
0 1,254.0 1,054,317.0 1,032,042.0 0 1,254.0 1,038,609.0 1,006,335.0
1 391.0 299,518.0 321,793.0 1 350.0 248,601.0 280,875.0
combined 1,645.0 1,353,835.0 1,353,835.0 combined 1,604.0 1,287,210.0 1,287,210.0
z = 3.317 z = 5.106
Prob > z = 0.0009 Prob > z = 0.0000
Pre-1982 dummy obs rank sum expected Pre-1982 dummy obs rank sum expected
0 141.0 118,941.0 88,477.5 0 150.0 120,487.5 93,450.0
1 1,113.0 667,944.0 698,407.5 1 1,095.0 655,147.5 682,185.0
combined 1,254.0 786,885.0 786,885.0 combined 1,245.0 775,635.0 775,635.0
z = 9.346 z = 7.958
Prob > z = 0.0009 Prob > z = 0.0000
               Long Term Relations for the Two Samples Pre and Post WWII
Specification 1 Specification 2
Reject the null with 99% Reject the null with 99%
Ho: Investment Bank long term relations is the same pre-
WWII and post WWII?
Ho: Investment Bank long term relations is the same pre-
WWII and post WWII?
Reject the null with 99% Reject the null with 99%
               Long Term Relations for the Two Samples Pre and Post 1982
Specification 1 Specification 2
Ho: Investment Bank long term relations is the same pre-
1982 and post 1982?
Ho: Investment Bank long term relations is the same pre-
1982 and post 1982?
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Table 4:  Underwriters and Lawyers Long Term Relations Composition by Ratings, 1946 -2012 
 
 
 
 
Number % of total Number % of total Total
Change 54 15.21% 64 11.99% 118
No change 301 84.79% 470 88.01% 771
Total 355 100.00% 534 100.00% 889
Change 70 20.83% 134 25.87% 204
No change 266 79.17% 384 74.13% 650
Total 336 100.00% 518 100.00% 854
Change 265 66.75% 523 76.69% 788
No change 132 33.25% 159 23.31% 291
Total 397 100.00% 682 100.00% 1,079
Number % of total Number % of total Total
Change 34 12.98% 19 11.24% 53
No change 228 87.02% 150 88.76% 378
Total 262 100.00% 169 100.00% 431
Change 46 18.40% 50 30.30% 96
No change 204 81.60% 115 69.70% 319
Total 250 100.00% 165 100.00% 415
Change 177 66.79% 125 70.22% 302
No change 88 33.21% 53 29.78% 141
Total 265 100.00% 178 100.00% 443
Number % of total Number % of total Total
Change 18 23.38% 38 12.50% 56
No change 59 76.62% 266 87.50% 325
Total 77 100.00% 304 100.00% 381
Change 18 25.00% 57 19.19% 75
No change 54 75.00% 240 80.81% 294
Total 72 100.00% 297 100.00% 369
Change 54 66.67% 275 79.02% 329
No change 27 33.33% 73 20.98% 100
Total 81 100.00% 348 100.00% 429
Investment 
Bank
Non-investment grade Investment grade
Non-investment grade Investment grade
Issuer 
Counsel
Investment 
Bank Counsel
Investment 
Bank
Issuer 
Counsel
Investment 
Bank Counsel
All sample
New York Law
English Law
Issuer 
Counsel
Investment 
Bank Counsel
Investment 
Bank
Non-investment grade Investment grade
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Table 5: Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for Investment Bank Long Term Relations for Two Samples, post-WWII 
 
 
 
 
obs rank sum expected obs rank sum expected obs rank sum expected
IC 979.0 929,029.0 983,895.0 IC 1,254.0 1,073,074.0 1,432,695.0 IB 1,254.0 1,125,701.5 1,400,718.0
IBC 1,030.0 1,090,016.0 1,035,150.0 IB 1,030.0 1,536,396.0 1,176,775.0 IBC 979.0 1,368,559.5 1,093,543.0
combined 2,009.0 2,019,045.0 2,019,045.0 combined 2,284.0 2,609,470.0 2,609,470.0 combined 2,233.0 2,494,261.0 2,494,261.0
z = -6.328 z = -26.713 z = -21.011
Prob > z = 0.0000 Prob > z = 0.0000 Prob > z = 0.0000
Reject the null with 99% Reject the null with 99% Reject the null with 99%
Issuers counsel and Underwriters counsel Issuers counsel and Investment Bank Underwriters counsel and Investment Bank
Ho: Issuers counsel and Underwriters counsel change is 
the same?
Ho: Issuers counsel and Investment Bank change is the 
same?
Ho:  Underwriters counsel and Investment Bank change 
is the same?
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Table 6: Top countries with one and two lawyers, all laws, 1946 - 2012 
 
 
 
Country Total Spread Investment 
grade
Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total
Poland 1 3.57% 0 0.00% 27 96.43% 28 1.221 96.15%
Uruguay 1 3.85% 0 0.00% 25 96.15% 26 2.302 38.46%
Lebanon 0 0.00% 2 9.52% 19 90.48% 21 3.198 5.26%
Brazil 4 8.33% 3 6.25% 41 85.42% 48 3.428 27.08%
Colombia 3 9.38% 5 15.63% 24 75.00% 32 3.770 44.44%
Venezuela 5 14.29% 4 11.43% 26 74.29% 35 3.620 0.00%
Philippines 3 6.52% 10 21.74% 33 71.74% 46 3.188 0.00%
Argentina 16 30.77% 2 3.85% 34 65.38% 52 3.868 0.00%
Mexico 5 7.46% 23 34.33% 39 58.21% 67 2.503 30.00%
Turkey 10 20.00% 16 32.00% 24 48.00% 50 5.107 12.00%
Italy 2 4.00% 48 96.00% 0 0.00% 50 -0.131 100.00%
South Africa 4 12.50% 28 87.50% 0 0.00% 32 2.498 42.11%
Norway 4 10.26% 34 87.18% 1 2.56% 39 0.400 100.00%
Denmark 5 13.89% 30 83.33% 1 2.78% 36 0.895 100.00%
Japan 3 9.09% 27 81.82% 3 9.09% 33 0.106 100.00%
Greece 7 14.58% 39 81.25% 2 4.17% 48 0.477 97.92%
Sweden 10 18.52% 41 75.93% 3 5.56% 54 -0.154 100.00%
Finland 22 33.85% 43 66.15% 0 0.00% 65 0.530 100.00%
Portugal 16 33.33% 30 62.50% 2 4.17% 48 -0.446 100.00%
Belgium 12 19.67% 38 62.30% 11 18.03% 61 -0.043 100.00%
One lawyer Two lawyersNo lawyer
Top countries with two lawyers
Top countries with one lawyer
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Table 7: Relation Between Lawyers and Sovereign Ratings, 1946-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Total Total
Number % total Number % total Number % total Number % total Number % total Number % total
Others 345 33.40% 688 66.60% 1,033 206 58.86% 144 41.14% 350 84 18.54% 369 81.46% 453
Cleary Gottlieb 127 66.84% 63 33.16% 190 95 64.19% 53 35.81% 148 27 72.97% 10 27.03% 37
Total 472 38.59% 751 61.41% 1,223 301 60.44% 197 39.56% 498 111 22.65% 379 77.35% 490
Others 376 35.67% 678 64.33% 1,054 205 60.47% 134 39.53% 339 111 22.79% 376 77.21% 487
Sullivan&Cromwell 96 56.80% 73 43.20% 169 96 60.38% 63 39.62% 159 0 0.00% 3 100.0% 3
Total 472 38.59% 751 61.41% 1,223 301 60.44% 197 39.56% 498 111 22.65% 379 77.35% 490
Issuer Counsel 
Underwriters Counsel
All jurisdictions New York Law English Law
Non Investment Investment grade Non Investment Investment grade Non Investment Investment grade
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Table 8 
Cost of Debt 
OLS results.  Dependent variable is the Spread between the interest rate of the bond and the rate on a U.S. 
Treasury bond with the same maturity. Ratings are taken from S&P with the pluses and minuses being 
combined with the lettered ratings.  BBB is the holdout category.  Ln(amount) is the log of the size of the 
issue. Maturity is stated in number of years. Number of Banks is the number of banks participating in the 
offer. Cleary is equal to one if that firm is the Issuer Counsel.  Top Underwriter is equal to one if Sullivan 
& Cromwell (US) or Linklaters (English) is the law firm working with the underwriter. Issuer Counsel and 
No Lawyers are dummy variables equal to 1 if there are two and zero law firms involved, respectively.  All 
models include fixed time effects.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the 
country level.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * 
indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AAA -1.599*** -1.476*** -2.828**
(0.535) (0.542) (1.228)
AA -1.319*** -1.427*** -1.504**
(0.410) (0.424) (0.708)
A -0.588 -0.350 -0.902
(0.394) (0.413) (0.667)
BB 1.982*** 1.381*** 3.240**
(0.528) (0.394) (1.466)
B 2.719*** 2.688*** 3.268***
(0.335) (0.401) (0.747)
Ln(amount) -0.0792 -0.317** 0.0818 -0.0990 -0.223 -0.650**
(0.0768) (0.126) (0.0935) (0.172) (0.174) (0.297)
Maturity -0.00943 0.00686 -0.0180** -0.0135 -0.0372 -0.0484
(0.0130) (0.0141) (0.00799) (0.0138) (0.0450) (0.0437)
Number of banks 0.00774 -0.00201 -0.0574*** -0.0622 0.0962 0.0845
(0.0368) (0.0305) (0.0211) (0.0414) (0.0955) (0.107)
Cleary 0.180 0.0297 -0.0480 -0.319 -0.776 0.177
(0.288) (0.382) (0.313) (0.455) (0.890) (1.190)
Top Underwriter -0.0168 0.340 0.0600 0.321 0.359 -0.0682
(0.193) (0.243) (0.175) (0.209) (0.360) (0.534)
Issuer Counsel -0.146 1.282*** 1.494*** 0.421 2.025*** 2.089*** -0.571 1.088 1.145*
(0.487) (0.434) (0.414) (0.352) (0.662) (0.734) (0.827) (0.790) (0.590)
No Lawyers -0.955 -0.507 -0.0449 -3.175*** -0.383 0.578 0.565
(0.748) (0.547) (0.333) (0.145) (1.282) (1.630) (0.719)
Constant 7.343*** 5.663*** 7.052*** 7.831*** 3.103*** 2.896*** -1.111 -0.782 -1.195**
(1.204) (1.060) (0.604) (0.622) (0.989) (0.461) (3.028) (2.644) (0.590)
Observations 791 857 1,072 355 371 445 298 328 409
R-squared 0.329 0.208 0.265 0.627 0.411 0.446 0.263 0.141 0.151
All Sample NY Law English Law
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Figure 1: Confederate Cotton Bond 
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Figure 2: Number of Issuances by Jurisdiction post-World War II 
 
 
Figure 3: Issuances by Jurisdiction and Number of Lawyers post-World War II 
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Figure 4: Investment Bank Long Term Relationship with Issuer, 1826-1945 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Investment Bank Long Term Relationship with Issuer, 1946-2012 
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Figure 6: Investment Bank Long Term relationship with Issuers; New York Law Bonds, 1946-2012 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Investment Bank Long Term Relationship with Issuers; English Law Bonds, 1946-2012 
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Figure 8: Issuer Counsel Long Term Relationship with Issuers, 1946-2012 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Investment Bank Counsel Long Term Relationship with Issuers, 1946-2012 
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Figure 10: Number of Law Firms; All Issuances 1946 – 2012 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Number of Lawyers;  New York Law Issuances, 1946 – 2012 
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Figure 12: Number of Law Firms; English Law Issuances, 1946 - 2012 
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